Disinformation as a weapon: legal limits of cognitive warfare under International Humanitarian Law

Abstract

Contemporary armed conflict increasingly operates through cognitive and informational domains, where disinformation functions as a strategic instrument capable of producing significant societal and operational effects. This development challenges the adequacy of International Humanitarian Law, which remains structured around kinetic assumptions of harm, targeting, and violence. Existing scholarship identifies regulatory gaps but lacks a systematic framework for interpreting how current legal principles apply to non-kinetic operations. This article addresses this gap by examining whether and under what conditions disinformation can be regulated within the Law of Armed Conflict. It adopts a doctrinal methodology grounded in treaty interpretation and functional, effects-based legal analysis, drawing on primary legal sources and contemporary operational practices. The findings demonstrate that disinformation does not fall outside the law but exposes limitations in prevailing interpretive paradigms, particularly regarding harm, targeting, and thresholds of conflict. By advancing a structured interpretive and threshold framework, the study refines existing doctrine and informs ongoing debates on the regulation of cognitive warfare.